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Introduction
The  complex  connectedness  of  infrastructure,  pro-
cesses, commodities, and services in our society gives 
rise to risk. Failure of any particular system or service 
can cause far-reaching harm propagated through net-
works of other systems. A striking example is the elec-
trical power failure that crippled much of Ontario and 
the  northeastern  United  States  in  August  2003 
(tinyurl.com/6qa5ode). The triggering event was a software 
bug in a control room system in Ohio, and it allowed a 
disastrous  power  surge  to  cascade  through  the  power 
distribution grid. In addition to the usual direct effects 
of  a  power  failure,  unanticipated  indirect  effects  were 
also experienced in the telecommunications, food, and 
transportation sectors. For example, in the Detroit area, 
residents  lost  water  pressure  because  of  failed  pumps 
in the water supply system. However, the lack of pres-
sure in the system resulted in potential contamination 
of  the  drinking  water,  which  resulted  in  a  “boil  water 
advisory” after the pressure was restored.
In order to safeguard society, we need to connect with 
our  connectedness.  Models  are  needed  to  prepare  for 
all  recognized  risks  so  that  actions  can  be  taken  to 
make  our  communities,  businesses,  governments  and 
environments as resilient as possible.
Typically,  risk  analysis  of  systems  with  complex  de-
pendency relationships is carried out by means of simu-
lation.  (A  constructive  simulation  is  a  computer 
program in which software components mimic the be-
havior  of  infrastructure  entities.  Systems  dynamics 
(tinyurl.com/yrqbyx)  provides  a  framework  and  tools  for 
building  a  constructive  simulation.  However,  such 
models  are  governed  by  mathematical  equations  that 
are difficult to calibrate against the real world. Extens-
ive  data  gathering  and  complex  computer  program-
Increasingly, our critical infrastructure is managed and controlled by computers and the 
information networks that connect them. Cyber-terrorists and other malicious actors un-
derstand the economic and social impact that a successful attack on these systems could 
have. While it is imperative that we defend against such attacks, it is equally imperative 
that we realize how best to react to them. This article presents the strongest-path method 
of analyzing all potential pathways of exposure to risk – no matter how indirect or circuit-
ous they may be – in a network model of infrastructure and operations. The method makes 
direct use of expert knowledge about entities and dependency relationships without the 
need for any simulation or any other models. By using path analysis in a directed graph 
model of critical infrastructure, planners can model and assess the effects of a potential at-
tack and develop resilient responses. 
If  you  can  look  into  the  seeds  of  time,  and  say 
which grains will grow and which will not, speak 
then to me who neither beg nor fear your favour 
nor your hate."
William Shakespeare (~1564–1616)
Poet and playwright
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ming  are  required  to  create  a  useful  model.  Con-
sequently, simulation models are time-consuming and 
costly to develop.
This article presents a technique, called the strongest-
path  method,  which  has  been  evolving  since  prepara-
tions  began  to  solve  the  Year  2000  problem,  or  “Y2K” 
(tinyurl.com/2z675x). The paradigm, together with calcula-
tion tools and graphical output features, has been im-
plemented  under  the  trade  name  RiskOutLook 
(riskoutlook.com)  as  java-based  software  available  exclus-
ively  from  Deep  Logic  Solutions  Inc  (deeplogicsolutions
inc.com).
The strongest-path method fathoms all potential path-
ways of exposure to risk – no matter how indirect or cir-
cuitous  they  may  be  –  in  a  network  model  of 
infrastructure and operations. The method makes direct 
use of expert knowledge about entities and dependency 
relationships without the need for any simulation or any 
other models. It can, however, incorporate results from 
simulation and other models if any are available.
This article will present the strongest-path method as a 
modelling  paradigm,  founded  on  risk  analysis,  that 
makes use of path analysis in a network representation 
of the entities and relationships in the environment of 
interest. The article starts with a description of the fun-
damental ideas in the paradigm. Next, it provides back-
ground information on risk analysis and path analysis in 
representations  of  networks  in  order  to  develop  the 
tools for risk analysis used in the strongest-path meth-
od. Next, an example problem is used to demonstrate a 
practical use of the method and tools. Finally, the im-
plications of this approach for planners and managers 
are discussed and conclusions are provided.
The Modelling Paradigm
Modern  society  can  be  viewed  as  a  collection  of  net-
works that overlap and interact with each other. There 
are  transportation  networks,  communications  net-
works, energy networks, supply chains, distribution net-
works,  social  networks,  cyber  networks,  and  so  on.  In 
both private enterprise and public service, from the na-
tional level down to the local community level, planners 
typically  divide  their  planning  domain  into  coherent 
subsets  called  sectors.  For  example,  at  the  provincial 
emergency  planning  level  in  Ontario,  Canada,  the  fol-
lowing sectors are defined:
• Food 
• Water
• Electricity
• Communications
• Healthcare
• Finance
• Natural Gas 
• Oil
• Transportation
• Government
• Public Safety and Security
Each  sector  takes  inputs  from  other  sectors  and,  by 
means  of  its  own  actors  and  activities,  produces  out-
puts that are in turn taken as inputs by other sectors. As 
well, there are internal and external controls and regu-
lations  that  govern  the  activities  of  any  sector  along 
with  monitoring  and  verification  agents  who  oversee 
the activities and processes. 
Planners describe their domains in terms of the actors, 
actions, controls, agents, inputs, and outputs that exist 
in  their  sector.  For  purposes  of  risk  analysis,  distinct 
and significant actors that exist in a sector will be re-
ferred to as entities. An interaction between two entit-
ies  will  be  referred  to  as  a  relationship.  By  using  a 
mathematical  object  known  as  a  directed  graph, 
RiskOutLook  creates  a  network  model  of  entities  and 
relationships that embodies the planner’s domain. En-
tities will be modelled as nodes in the graph and rela-
tionships will be modelled as links in the graph, which 
are called edges. Because all of the edges have a direc-
tion from one entity to another, the graph is a directed 
graph.
A dependency relationship is a special kind of relation-
ship in which there is a transaction between two entit-
ies. The transaction can be physical (e.g., electricity or 
water) or non-physical (e.g., data or instructions). The 
risks in our society that result from connectedness can 
be  characterized  as  stemming  from  dependency  rela-
tionships.  The  strength  of  a  relationship  is  measured 
by a weight called the degree of dependence.
Direct  dependency  relationships  are  well  understood 
by  domain  experts;  indirect  dependencies  are  more 
complex. Modelling and analysis is needed to verify or 
correct  intuition  and  to  synthesize  expert  knowledge 
into a comprehensive assessment of the effects of direct 
and indirect dependencies and their associated risks.Technology Innovation Management Review August 2013
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Risk and Dependency Analysis
For purposes of infrastructure analysis, risk is the pos-
sibility  of  loss  (Rowe,  1988;  tinyurl.com/kmo7gd2).  The 
strongest-path method describes loss using two dimen-
sions:  i)  degree  of  impact  and  ii)  likelihood  of  occur-
rence.  The  method  then  proceeds  to  aggregate 
assessments of cumulative impact resulting from mul-
tiple pathways of exposure to loss through pathways in 
the network model. 
Estimates  of  likelihood  of  occurrence  can  be  made  in 
terms of “degree of belief” or “expert judgment”. For the 
purposes  of  modelling  infrastructure,  experience  has 
shown  that  a  scale  of  high,  medium,  and  low  is  suffi-
cient. High-likelihood events are deemed to have more 
than  an  80%  likelihood  of  occurrence  and  low-likeli-
hood  events  are  deemed  to  have  less  than  20%  likeli-
hood  of  occurrence  during  the  time  interval  under 
consideration; all other events therefore have a medium 
likelihood of occurrence. More complex models can be 
created for situations that evolve over multiple time in-
tervals.
An  infrastructure  is  said  to  “fail”  if  it  falls  below  a 
threshold  level  of  its  expected  or  required  outputs. 
From  this  definition,  we  develop  the  following  criteria 
for degree of direct dependence:
1. If failure of entity x inevitably leads to failure of entity 
y, then y has a high direct dependency on x, and con-
versely x has a high direct impact on y.
2. If failure of entity x leads to degradation of entity y to 
the extent that y must enact a contingency plan or re-
sort to alternate operating procedures in order to stay 
above  the  expected  threshold,  then  y  has  a  medium 
direct dependency on x and conversely x has a medi-
um direct impact on y.
3. If failure of entity x leads to significant degradation of 
entity y, but y can stay above its expected threshold 
without  significantly  changing  its  operating  proced-
ures, then y has a low direct dependency on x and con-
versely x has a low direct impact on y.
4. If failure of entity x does not lead to significant degrad-
ation of entity y, then y has zero direct dependency on 
x, and conversely x has zero direct impact on y.
A  directed  path  in  a  directed  graph  is  a  sequence  of 
nodes with the property that each node in the sequence 
is connected to its successor by an edge. For example, 
in  Figure  1,  {s→w→x→y}  is  a  directed  path,  whereas 
{s→w→x→v} is not, because {x→v} does not exist.
In order to derive a method for estimating the impact of 
every node in a graph on all nodes in the graph, path 
analysis is used. In particular, the analysis will be used 
to identify the paths of strongest impact, from any node 
x  to  any  node  y  (including  x  itself).  The  paths  of 
strongest impact, will be referred to as strongest paths. 
To visually indicate the strength of impact in a directed 
graph  (e.g.,  Figure  1),  the  edges  are  coded  as  follows: 
red/solid  for  high  impact,  orange/dashed  for  medium 
impact, and yellow/dotted for low impact. 
We  have  described  the  effect  of  a  high  direct  impact 
event on a direct dependent. However, we also need to 
estimate the effect of a medium direct impact event and 
a low direct impact event on a direct dependent. There 
are  two  dimensions  for  this  estimate:  i)  the  degree  of 
the triggering impact event and ii) the degree of the dir-
ect dependency relationship. 
It is reasonable to expect that a strong triggering event 
will  have  little  impact  if  the  degree  of  dependence  is 
low, whereas even a relatively weak triggering event will 
be felt if the degree of direct dependence is high. Thus, 
we estimate that the propagated impact can be no high-
er than the lesser of the triggering degree of impact and 
the  degree  of  dependence.  For  example,  according  to 
Figure 1. A directed graph with weighted edges 
(red/solid = high impact, orange/dashed = medium 
impact, yellow/dotted = low impact)Technology Innovation Management Review August 2013
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this principle, a medium-degree triggering impact act-
ing over a low-degree of direct dependence will cause a 
low impact because the degree of direct dependence is 
low,  whereas,  a  medium-impact  trigger  acting  over  a 
high degree of direct dependence can cause a medium 
impact  because  of  the  high  degree  of  direct  depend-
ence. 
As we proceed along a path in Figure 1, our propaga-
tion rule compares the lowest-degree edge we have yet 
encountered  with  the  degree  of  the  next  edge  on  the 
path  and  sets  the  triggering  degree  of  impact  to  the 
lower value. Therefore, the indirect dependence of any 
node on any other node along a selected path is driven 
by  the  lowest-degree  edge  along  that  path.  For  ex-
ample, consider the graph in Figure 1 and all paths con-
necting s to t. These four paths are shown in Figure 2 
and can be described as follows:
• Path 1 = {s→t} 
• Path 2 = {s→w→x→y→z→t}
• Path 3 = {s→u→v→x→y→z→t}
• Path 4 = {s→u→y→z→t}
Using the propagation rule, we find that the impact of s 
on t from Path 1 is low by virtue of (s, t), the impact of s 
on t from path 2 is medium by virtue of (s, w) and (x, y), 
the impact of s on t from Path 3 is low by virtue of (u, v) 
and (v, x), and the impact of s on t is high from Path 4 
by virtue of all of its edges being high degree. Therefore, 
the  indirect  dependence  of  t  on  s  is  high  and  the 
strongest path is Path 4.
Proceeding from the direct impact and likelihood of fail-
ure  of  each  node  coupled  with  the  ability  to  measure 
the strongest path from one node to any other, we can 
calculate other useful metrics. For any nodes x and z in 
any directed graph we can calculate:
1.  Strongest-path  impact  of  x  on  z:  This  is  the 
strongest-path degree of dependence of z on x multi-
plied by the direct impact of x. 
2. Cumulative impact of x on z: This includes a term for 
every pathway that exists from x to z. Similar to the 
binomial  probability  function,  this  metric  com-
pounds the effects of all of the terms. 
Figure 2. All paths connecting s to t in the graph shown in Figure 1Technology Innovation Management Review August 2013
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3. Global impact of x on the entire graph: By “global”, 
we  mean  the  impact  of  any  node  x  on  the  entire 
graph. This metric is calculated using the impact x on 
every node z in the graph and summing the terms. 
4. Global vulnerability of x from the entire graph: The 
cumulative  vulnerability  of  x  from  all  nodes  in  the 
model is the binomial probability that a failure event 
of any node will cause x to fail.
5.  Risk  index  of  x:  The  risk  index  of  an  entity  is  the 
product  of  the  global  impact  of  an  entity  times  its 
global  vulnerability.  This  metric  provides  a  single 
score for comparing risk among all of the entities in a 
model.
Finally,  we  describe  how  to  find  the  strongest-path
degree of dependence between all pairs of nodes. By ad-
apting  any  “shortest  path”  algorithm  we  can  find  a 
strongest path from any node x to any node z as follows:
1. Within the graph, remove all edges except for those 
of high degree.
2.  If  the  shortest  path  from  x  to  z  exists,  then  it  is  a 
strongest path and z has high dependence on x.
3. Otherwise, put the medium-degree edges back into 
the graph.
4.  If  the  shortest  path  from  x  to  z  exists,  then  it  is  a 
strongest path and z has medium dependence on x.
5.  Otherwise,  put  the  low-degree  edges  back  into  the 
graph.
6.  If  the  shortest  path  from  x  to  z  exists,  then  it  is  a 
strongest path and z has low dependence on x.
7. Otherwise, z has zero dependence on x. 
A Practical Application of the Method
In this section, we use an example network model to il-
lustrate the practical use of the strongest-path method. 
The example model, shown in Figure 3, is a small infra-
structure model with  10 entities: Drinking Water, Local 
Electrical Distribution, Natural Gas Storage and Trans-
port,  Ambulance  Services,  Local  Food  Outlets,  Local 
Food  Distribution,  Farm  Food  Production,  Health 
Canada/Food Inspection, Hospitals & Clinics, and Cy-
ber Networks. 
For  each  of  these  entities,  the  degree  of  impact  has 
been assessed, as indicated by the number on the left 
side of each node in Figure 3: high (score = 7, dark or-
ange),  medium  (score  =  5,  orange),  or  low  (score  =  3, 
yellow). As well, the likelihood of failure has been as-
sessed for each entity, as indicated by the number on 
the right side of each node: high (score = 7, dark orange 
border),  medium  (score  =  5,  orange  border),  or  low 
(score = 3, yellow border).
There are 30 direct-dependency relationships that have 
been scored high (score = 9, red edges), medium (score 
Figure 3. A small infrastructure modelTechnology Innovation Management Review August 2013
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= 5, orange edges), and low (score = 3, yellow edges). All 
entities  except  Local  Electrical  Distribution  have  been 
assessed as having medium dependence on Cyber Net-
works. Local Electrical Distribution, however, has been 
scored as having high dependence on Cyber Networks.
After path analysis is carried out and scores for global 
impact and global vulnerability are computed, a histo-
gram of the risk indices can be created, as shown in Fig-
ure  4.  The  bars  represent  risk-index  scores  arranged 
from the lowest score to highest score, from left to right. 
The highest-risk entity in the model is Local Electrical 
Distribution.  The  second-highest  entity  is  Local  Food 
Distribution. At medium risk are three entities: Health 
Canada/Food Inspection, Local Food Outlets, and Cy-
ber  Networks.  The  remaining  entities  are  of  relatively 
low risk.
Even  though  Cyber  Networks  is  assessed  as  medium 
risk in the model, we can still assess all consequent im-
pact were it to fail. Figure 5 shows the sub-network of 
high-dependency relationships in the model.
From this sub-network, we can isolate the paths of high 
impact emanating out of the Cyber Networks entity, as 
depicted in Figure 6.
Although  only  Local  Electrical  Distribution  has  a  high 
direct dependence on Cyber Networks, Figure 6 shows 
that Local Food Distribution, Local Food Outlets, Hos-
pitals & Clinics, and Ambulance Services would all fail if 
Cyber Networks were to fail. 
Figure 4. Histogram of the risk indices for the model 
shown in Figure 3
Figure 5. High-dependency relationships for the example 
model shown in Figure 3
Discussion
The strongest-path method provides a tool for assess-
ing and prioritizing risk. The risk index provides a glob-
al  measure  of  risk  for  every  entity  in  a  model.  This 
depiction of risk is of strategic value to decision makers 
in that it gives them a strategic prioritization of every 
entity.
Moreover,  with  the  strongest-path  method,  the  global 
impact and global vulnerability of every entity in a mod-
el is assessed so that a separate prioritization – based 
on  either  impact  or  vulnerability  –  is  available  to  de-
cision  makers.  Thus,  any  scenario  of  high  impact  can 
be identified, no matter how unlikely it is to occur. Con-
versely, possible situations of triggering events for un-
likely scenarios can be identified from the path analysis.
Figure 6. Paths of high impact from the Cyber Networks 
entity for the model shown in Figure 3Technology Innovation Management Review August 2013
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With the strongest-path method, the influence of every 
node on every other node in a model is assessed. Con-
sequently,  decision  makers  can  make  plans  based  on 
identified pathways of exposure to risk. Risk-mitigation 
plans  and  contingency  plans  can  take  into  considera-
tion  chains  of  events  that  might  otherwise  have  gone 
unnoticed.
A  model  based  on  the  strongest-path  method  can  be 
made  as  detailed  as  required  for  the  decision-making 
requirements of the planners or managers who will use 
it. Entities should embody the level of detail that is sig-
nificant in the environment of interest. For example, a 
cyber network might be modelled at the level of indi-
vidual servers and computers together with the direct 
connections that link them together. This model might 
also  include  entities  and  relationships  that  model 
power sources and the distribution of power.
In  situations  where  entities  and  relationships  change 
over  time,  a  time-oriented  model  can  be  built  using 
time-intervals that represent periods when changes do 
not occur among the entities and relationships. For ex-
ample,  consider  a  hospital  that  has  a  backup  power 
generator  with  36  hours  of  fuel  to  sustain  it  during  a 
power failure. At t=0, the hospital has medium depend-
ence on local power distribution because of its backup 
system.  Once  the  power  failure  starts,  it  has  high  de-
pendence on its backup generator until t=36 hours. By 
that time, it must have acquired more fuel or it must 
shut down, and it is deemed to have failed if there is 
low likelihood of having fuel delivered by that time. Any 
entities with high dependence on that hospital will also 
fail at t=36 hours.
Conclusion
The strongest-path method is a paradigm for modelling 
infrastructure  risk  using  a  directed  graph.  Models  are 
constructed from entities that are assessed with a de-
gree of impact and a likelihood of failure together with 
dependency relationships between the entities that are 
scored  for  degree  of  dependence  according  to  well 
defined criteria. 
The  paradigm  allows  the  knowledge  of  experts  to  be 
used for infrastructure risk analysis. Results from other 
analytical models, such as simulations, can also be in-
cluded in a model. As a result of performing the path 
analysis,  such  models  reveal  the  potential  con-
sequences of the failure of any entity on all of the oth-
ers. This enables contingency planners to anticipate all 
outcomes in any infrastructure damage scenario. 
The strongest-path method and the RiskOutLook soft-
ware are currently being used by Emergency Manage-
ment Ontario to manage risks in critical infrastructure. 
The  provinces  of  New  Brunswick  and  Saskatchewan 
will soon begin projects to build similar infrastructure 
models.